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REHABILITATING CONCESSION THEORY 
STEFAN J. PADFIELD∗ 
Abstract 
In Citizens United v. FEC, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court ruled 
that “the Government cannot restrict political speech based on the 
speaker's corporate identity.”  The decision remains controversial, with 
many arguing that the Court effectively overturned more than 100 years of 
precedent.  I have previously argued that this decision turned on competing 
conceptions of the corporation, with the majority adopting a contractarian 
view while the dissent advanced a state concession view.  However, the 
majority opinion was silent on the issue of corporate theory, and the dissent 
went so far as to expressly disavow any role for corporate theory at all.  At 
least as far as the dissent is concerned, this avoidance of corporate theory 
may have been motivated at least in part by the marginalization of 
concession theory.  In fact, concession theory’s marginalization has 
become so extreme that advocating for it exposes one to mockery by some 
of the most esteemed experts in corporate law.  For example, one highly 
regarded commentator criticized the dissent by saying: “It has been over 
half-a-century since corporate legal theory, of any political or economic 
stripe, took the concession theory seriously.”  In this Essay I consider 
whether this marginalization of concession theory is justified.  I conclude 
that the reports of concession theory’s demise have been greatly 
exaggerated and that there remains a serious role for the theory in 
discussions concerning the place of corporations in society.  This is 
important because without a vibrant concession theory we are left primarily 
with aggregate theory and real entity theory, two theories of the 
corporation that both defer to private ordering over government regulation.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ Professor, University of Akron School of Law (B.A., Brown University; J.D., 
University of Kansas).  A draft of this Essay was presented at the National Business Law 
Scholars Conference held at the University of Cincinnati School of Law on June 28-29, 
2012; a faculty workshop held at the University of Toledo College of Law on Oct. 17, 2012; 
and the Central States Law Schools Association 2012 Scholarship Conference held at the 
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law on Oct. 19-20, 2012.  My thanks to all the participants 
for their helpful comments.  Special thanks also to Wilson Huhn, Lyman Johnson, Martin 
Petrin, and Elizabeth Pollman. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
328 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:327 
 
 
Table of Contents 
I. Introduction ............................................................................................ 328 
II. An Overview of the Theories of the Corporation ................................. 330 
A. In the Beginning: Artificial Entity / Concession Theory ................. 331 
B. Freeing the Corporation: Aggregate / Nexus-of-Contracts Theory .. 335 
C. Seeking the Best of Both Worlds: Real / Natural Entity Theory ..... 337 
D. The Struggle Continues: From Real Entity Back To Aggregate ...... 338 
1. The Problems with Real Entity Theory ........................................ 338 
2. The Contractarian Response ......................................................... 340 
III. Demonstrating the Viability of Concession Theory by Responding to 
the Arguments Against It .......................................................................... 342 
A. The Argument That Corporate Theory Is Excessively Malleable.... 343 
B. The Argument That Concession Theory Died Along with Special 
Charters ................................................................................................. 346 
C. The Argument That Listeners’ Rights Trump Corporate Theory .... 349 
D. The Argument That the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine 
Trumps Concession Theory .................................................................. 353 
IV. Conclusion .......................................................................................... 359 
I. Introduction 
What is a corporation?  It seems necessary to answer that question before 
concluding, as the Supreme Court did in Citizens United, that “the 
Government cannot restrict political speech based on the speaker's 
corporate identity.”1  This is true even if one understands the Citizens 
United opinion to be fundamentally based on listeners’ rights theory, which 
justifies First Amendment protection by focusing not on the rights of 
speakers but rather on the need for citizens in a democracy to be fully 
informed.2 Even then the question remains whether there is something 
about corporations that justifies including them in the line of cases carving 
out First Amendment exceptions for particular identity-based restrictions on 
speech.3  
                                                                                                                 
 1. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 346 (2010). 
 2. See Jessica A. Levinson, We the Corporations? The Constitutionality of Limitations 
on Corporate Electoral Speech After Citizens United, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 307, 339 (2011) 
(“Justice Kennedy's focus on the importance of unrestricted corporate electoral speech to 
self-government hinges on his belief that such communications provide important 
information for voters.”). 
 3. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 420 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]n a variety of 
contexts, we have held that speech can be regulated differentially on account of the speaker's 
identity, when identity is understood in categorical or institutional terms.”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss2/4
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This Essay discusses a particular aspect of what I have previously 
referred to as the “silent corporate theory debate” running through many of 
the Court’s campaign finance cases.4  Specifically, I want to “rehabilitate”5 
concession theory, which views the corporation as fundamentally a creature 
of the state and thus presumptively subject to broad state regulation.6  I 
believe this is an important project because (1) of the three traditional 
theories of the corporation under constitutional law (concession theory,7 
real entity theory,8 and aggregate theory9) concession theory is the only one 
that legitimizes presumptive deference to state regulation, and (2) 
commentators have unduly marginalized concession theory in recent 
years.10  These two factors combine to tilt the playing field in favor of 
private ordering and deregulation in a way that does not comport either with 
the relative strengths of the respective theories or with the recent vivid 
examples of market failure.11  Thus, rehabilitating concession theory will 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See Stefan J. Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court’s 
Campaign Finance Cases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 831, 831 (2013); cf. ERIC SEGALL, 
SUPREME MYTHS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A COURT AND ITS JUSTICES ARE NOT 
JUDGES 2-3 (2012) (“[B]ecause judges are governmental officials who exercise coercive 
power, it is important that they explain their legal decisions with honesty and 
transparency.”). 
 5. Somewhat ironically, I drew my inspiration for the title of this Essay from DAVID E. 
BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST 
PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2011). 
 6. It is important to understand that the version of concession theory I am advancing 
here creates a presumption in favor of state regulation, as opposed to giving state regulators 
unbridled powers. See infra note 29.  But see Reza Dibadj, (Mis)Conceptions of the 
Corporation, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 733 (2013) (“My thesis is simple: a corporation, as 
a legislative creature, should only enjoy those rights bestowed upon it by its creator.”). 
 7. Concession theory is also sometimes referred to as artificial entity theory.  See infra 
Part II.A. 
 8. Real entity theory is also sometimes referred to as natural entity theory.  See infra 
Part II.C. 
 9. Aggregate theory is also sometimes referred to as associational or partnership 
theory, and is frequently equated with nexus-of-contracts theory or contractarianism.  See 
infra Part II.B. 
 10. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Citizens United v. FEC: Stevens' Pernicious 
Version of the Concession Theory, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Jan. 21, 2010, 4:05 PM) 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/01/citizens-united-v-fec-
stevens-pernicious-version-of-the-concession-theory.html (“It has been over half-a-century 
since corporate legal theory, of any political or economic stripe, took the concession theory 
seriously.”). 
 11. Cf. Stephen Foley, Greenspan Says Crisis Left Him in ‘Shocked Disbelief’, 
INDEPENDENT (Oct. 24, 2008), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/ 
news/greenspan-says-crisis-left-him-in-shocked-disbelief-971609.html# (“Alan Greenspan, 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
330 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:327 
 
 
restore some much-needed balance to the current debate about the proper 
role of corporations in our society.12 
Following this Introduction, Part II provides a brief overview of the 
primary theories of the corporation, presenting the theories in the order that 
they gained prominence historically in the United States.  From at least one 
perspective, the story here is one of repeated attempts to free corporations 
from the perceived regulatory shackles of concession theory.  While it is 
fair to say that these attempts were in large part successful in application, 
they are arguably less successful in terms of theoretical coherence, leaving 
the door open for a resurgence of concession theory.  Part III will then seek 
to demonstrate why concession theory remains viable by rebutting some of 
the primary arguments against its relevance in cases like Citizens United.  
These arguments include the excessive malleability of corporate theory, the 
incompatibility of concession theory with the modern enabling-act structure 
of corporate law, the irrelevance of concession theory in light of the 
triumph of listeners’ rights, and the difficulties inherent in applying 
concession theory in light of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.  
While these arguments all make valid points, I explain why they are 
ultimately unable to carry the weight their proponents seek to place on 
them.  Finally, I provide some concluding remarks in Part IV. 
II. An Overview of the Theories of the Corporation 
Constitutional law and corporate law present different theories of the 
corporation. The three traditional theories under constitutional law are (1) 
artificial entity theory, (2) real entity theory, and (3) aggregate theory.13  
The primary theories under corporate law are (1) concession theory, (2) 
director-primacy and team-production theory, and (3) nexus-of-contracts 
                                                                                                                 
the former chairman of the US Federal Reserve, has dramatically repudiated large parts of 
his laissez-faire ideology and joined the chorus of voices saying that the credit crisis reveals 
a need for more regulation of the finance industry.”). 
 12. See Fenner L. Stewart, Jr., Indeterminacy and Balance: A Path to a Wholesome 
Corporate Law, 9 RUTGERS BUS. L. REV. 81, 86 (2012) (“When . . . a balance between 
theories exists, a robust debate can occur where no ideas are raised to the status of ‘truth’ 
while other theories are off the table before the debate begins.  This would lead to . . . more 
complexity than presently exists within corporate legal discourse, helping to immunize the 
law from the sort of oversimplifications that might offer ‘ease of comprehension’ at the risk 
of ‘positive error.’”) (citations omitted). 
 13. See Martin Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm—From Nature to 
Function, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 3), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2225447 (tracing “historical approaches to the nature of legal 
entities, which have focused on whether a firm is real, a fiction, or an aggregate”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss2/4
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theory (contractarianism).14  While one should be careful not to overstate 
the overlap between conceptualizations of the corporation for purposes of 
constitutional and corporate governance analysis, artificial entity theory is 
typically equated with concession theory,15 while aggregate theory is 
typically equated with contractarianism.16  In addition, I have previously 
aligned real entity theory with the director-primacy and team-production 
theories.17  I will detail the important aspects of these theories in the sub-
parts that follow. 
A. In the Beginning: Artificial Entity / Concession Theory 
In 1819, in the case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 
Justice Marshall famously stated: 
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and 
existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of 
law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its 
creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its 
very existence. . . . The objects for which a corporation is created 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BLACK LETTER OUTLINES: 
CORPORATIONS 327-32 (5th ed. 2006) (citing concession theory, nexus-of-contracts theory, 
and “process” theory).  As I will explain below, my decision to treat the director-primacy 
and team-production theories separately, as opposed to lumping them in with 
contractarianism, is somewhat controversial. See infra note 17. 
 15. See Joseph F. Morrissey, A Contractarian Critique of Citizens United, 15 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 765, 807 (2013) (discussing “the state entity theory (also known as the artificial 
entity theory or the concession theory)”).  But see John Dewey, The Historical Background 
of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 667 (1926). 
It is clear that there is nothing essentially in common between the fiction and 
concession theories, although they both aimed toward the same general 
consequence, as far as limitation of power of corporate bodies is concerned. 
The fiction theory is ultimately a philosophical theory that the corporate body is 
but a name, a thing of the intellect; the concession theory may be indifferent as 
to the question of the reality of a corporate body; what it must insist upon is that 
its legal power is derived. 
Id. 
 16. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. 
REV. 999, 1025 n.142 (“The point that the nexus of contracts theory is a reinvention of the 
aggregate view has been made repeatedly.”) (citations omitted). 
 17. This decision is controversial at the very least because Stephen Bainbridge, the 
scholar most commonly associated with director-primacy theory, rejects the characterization.  
See Padfield, supra note 4, at 843 n.41 (citing “our multi-blog post discussion of the issue”).  
But see id. (“On the other hand, Lynn Stout [one of the scholars most commonly associated 
with team-production theory] responded . . . with an e-mail asserting that my description of 
the issue was ‘as well put as I've seen it.’”). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
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are universally such as the government wishes to promote. They 
are deemed beneficial to the country; and this benefit constitutes 
the consideration, and, in most cases, the sole consideration of 
the grant.18  
This formulation has been understood to represent the concession theory of 
the corporation, which views the corporation as a tremendous capital 
accumulation device that was only made possible by the state conveying 
certain privileges to incorporators for which they could not otherwise 
privately contract.19  The rationale for granting these privileges was that the 
state could thereby achieve goals that might otherwise fail for lack of 
funding.20 
 As an aside, Dartmouth College also supports the contract view of the 
corporation.21  This contract view of the corporation should be contrasted 
with the aggregate view of the corporation as a nexus-of-contracts, which 
will be discussed in more detail below.  Despite their similar nomenclature, 
these theories are readily distinguishable.  The contract theory identifies the 
state as one of the key contracting parties, while aggregate nexus-of-
contracts theory views the state as merely providing default rules to 
facilitate private ordering among other parties via the corporate form.22 
Regardless, Dartmouth College remains primarily associated with 
concession theory. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines “concession” as “[a] government grant 
for specific privileges.”23  In the case of corporations, the grant consists of a 
bundle of rights including “immortality,” free transferability of ownership 
rights, and limited liability.24  Of these, limited liability is perhaps the most 
                                                                                                                 
 18. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636-37 (1819). 
 19. See Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency 
Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 68 (1992) (noting “the ‘concession theory’ of the 
corporation attributable to Dartmouth College . . . [is] the idea that corporations are created 
and empowered as a ‘concession’ from the state political authority”). 
 20. See, e.g., JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT 
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 43 (2003) (“The early American states used chartered 
corporations, endowed with special monopoly rights, to build some of the vital infrastructure 
of the new country . . . .”). 
 21. See Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 650 (“The opinion of the Court, after mature 
deliberation, is, that this [charter] is a contract, the obligation of which cannot be impaired, 
without violating the constitution of the United States.”). 
 22. See Padfield, supra note 4, at 835 (setting forth a table distinguishing the theories). 
 23. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 328 (9th ed. 2009). 
 24. See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 5 (2d ed. 2009) (describing five basic 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss2/4
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important.25  In fact, “[i]n 1911, the President of Columbia University, 
Nicholas Murray Butler, stated that the invention of the ‘limited liability 
corporation’ was ‘the greatest single discovery of modern times.’”26  
Furthermore, Larry Ribstein has argued that state-conferred corporate 
limited liability is the biggest obstacle in the way of nexus-of-contracts 
theory gaining unquestioned dominance.27    
Under concession theory, the state retains significant presumptive 
authority to regulate the corporate entity in exchange for granting this 
bundle of rights to incorporators.28  However, it is important to note here 
that I am using “concession theory” to denote a theory of the corporation 
that gives deference to government regulation, as opposed to removing all 
limits on the state’s right to regulate corporations.29  Thus, as opposed to the 
                                                                                                                 
characteristics of corporations as “(1) legal personality, (2) limited liability, (3) transferable 
shares, (4) centralized management under a board structure, and (5) shared ownership by 
contributors of capital”). 
 25. Cf. Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 
1629, 1634 n.27 (“In the nineteenth century, there was some variation as limited liability 
gained acceptance.”). 
 26. Stephen B. Presser, The Bogalusa Explosion, “Single Business Enterprise,” “Alter 
Ego,” and Other Errors: Academics, Economics, Democracy, and Shareholder Limited 
Liability: Back Towards a Unitary “Abuse” Theory of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 100 NW. 
U. L. REV. 405, 409 (2006). 
 27. Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. 
REV. 80, 82, 83 (1991) (rejecting “the conception of limited liability as a state-conferred 
privilege” and explaining that this is important because “recognition of limited liability as 
the product of private ordering compels acceptance of the contract theory of the 
corporation”). 
 28. See Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 208 (2004) 
(“This state-creation characterization effectively sets a presumption in favor of regulating 
corporations that does not apply to other business associations or contracts.”). 
 29. The distinction between these versions of concession theory may require more 
fleshing out in the future.  For example, one could contrast what may be called 
“presumptive” and “directive” concession theory.  Presumptive concession theory would 
support granting a type of rebuttable presumption in favor of state regulation of corporations, 
while directive concession theory would support recognizing an essentially unlimited right 
on the part of the state to determine corporate rights and responsibilities.  For now, I am 
content to simply note that I use “concession theory” broadly, as set forth in the remainder of 
this section, leaving room for limiting the state’s ability to regulate corporations where the 
presumption in favor of state regulation is properly rebutted.  Thus, while an application of 
concession theory as I envision it would have precluded the Citizens United majority from 
proclaiming (1) that corporations and individuals are indistinguishable for purposes of First 
Amendment analyses, or (2) that the burden of proof regarding the Framers’ view of 
corporations should have been on those claiming the right to restrict corporate political 
spending, the majority might still have been able to overturn the relevant statute by, for 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
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“extreme” view of concession theory that advocates that “corporations, as 
creatures of the State, have only those rights granted them by the State,”30 
the better view might be as then-Justice Rehnquist set forth in his dissent in 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti: “Since it cannot be disputed that 
the mere creation of a corporation does not invest it with all the liberties 
enjoyed by natural persons, our inquiry must seek to determine which 
constitutional protections are ‘incidental to its very existence.’”31  Thus, 
while it may be true that “a corporation’s right of commercial speech . . . 
might be considered necessarily incidental to the business of a commercial 
corporation[, i]t cannot be so readily concluded that the right of political 
expression is equally necessary to carry out the functions of a corporation 
organized for commercial purposes.”32 
This deference might play out in application by, for example, placing the 
burden of proof in a particular case on the party seeking to avoid 
government regulation of corporations.  For example, in Citizens United, 
both Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens believed the other had the burden of 
proving their preferred interpretation of the Framers’ attitude toward 
corporations and the implications thereof for interpreting the scope of the 
First Amendment.  Wrote Justice Scalia:  
Though faced with a constitutional text that makes no distinction 
between types of speakers, the dissent feels no necessity to 
provide even an isolated statement from the founding era to the 
effect that corporations are not covered, but places the burden on 
appellant to bring forward statements showing that they are.33   
Justice Stevens, meanwhile, argued: “Given that corporations were 
conceived of as artificial entities and do not have the technical capacity to 
‘speak,’ the burden of establishing that the Framers and ratifiers understood 
‘the freedom of speech’ to encompass corporate speech is, I believe, far 
heavier than the majority acknowledges.”34  Similarly, the concession 
                                                                                                                 
example, identifying relevant studies proving that the regulation caused sufficient harm to 
the marketplace of ideas.   Put another way, I am arguing that the proper application of 
concession theory translates into the same sort of deference given the regulation of prisoner 
or federal employee speech.  See infra Part III.C. 
 30. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978) (emphasis 
added). 
 31. Id. at 824 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. 
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)) (citations omitted). 
 32. Id. at 825 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 33. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 380 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 34. Id. at 428 n.55 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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theory for which I advocate would favor placing the burden here on Justice 
Scalia, but it would not deny him the opportunity to carry that burden.35 
B. Freeing the Corporation: Aggregate / Nexus-of-Contracts Theory 
Perhaps precisely because concession theory justified state regulation, 
there soon arose an effort to free corporations from regulatory restrictions 
by replacing concession theory with another corporate theory that provided 
more protection for corporate interests.36  Of course, concession theory was 
also being undermined by changes in the structure of corporate law, 
including the end of the special charter era of incorporation.37  In addition, 
some calls for a new theory were the result of actually wanting to hold 
corporations more accountable.38  Nonetheless, there is ample support for 
the view that real entity theory and aggregate theory emerged primarily in 
response to the perceived excessive regulatory power of the state.39 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Cf. Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of 
Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 918 (2011) (noting that “remnants 
of artificial entity theory manifest as balancing tests”). 
 36. The aggregate view that arose to challenge concession theory has arguably been 
around as long as concession theory.  See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 
Cranch) 61 (1809) (looking to the individuals composing a bank corporation to determine 
whether the corporation had a right to sue in federal court under diversity jurisdiction).  
However, its rise to prominence is likely best viewed as coming after the dominant period of 
concession theory.  See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Moving Beyond Animal Rights: A 
Legal/Contractualist Critique, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 27, 54-55 (2009) (“The artificial entity 
theory dominated the first part of the 1800s. . . . The aggregate entity theory of corporate 
personhood was also invoked beginning in the 1800s, and it reached prominence in the latter 
half of the century.”).   
 37. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: 
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 73 (1992) (“The problem faced by legal thinkers during 
the late nineteenth century was how to re-conceptualize the corporation after the demise of 
the grant theory.”). 
 38. Petrin, supra note 13, at 10 (“At the turn of the twentieth century, the increasing 
importance and prevalence of corporations led to growing dissatisfaction with the fiction 
theory’s effects, including its hostility toward liability of legal entities.”). 
 39. See Dibadj, supra note 6, at 759 (“I argue that anti-regulatory fervor, coupled with a 
desire to elevate the managerial class in society, best explain why artificial entity theory has 
fallen out of favor. Instrumental reasons explain the rise of the associational and natural 
entity theories more than logic might.”); David Millon, The Ambiguous Significance of 
Corporate Personhood 4 (Washington & Lee Pub. L. & Legal Theory Research Paper Ser., 
Working Paper No. 01-6, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=264141 (“Opponents 
of governmental regulation of the corporation relied on the aggregate characterization.”); 
Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. 
L. REV. 173, 221 (1985) (“The main effect of the natural entity theory of the business 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
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Aggregate theory arguably achieved this end by highlighting the falsity 
of viewing corporations as independent “creatures” of the state, when in 
fact there was ultimately nothing more substantial to corporations than the 
individuals who comprised them.  Under this analysis, the individuals at the 
top of this food chain were the shareholders who were understood to own 
the corporation.40  Thus, when the state tried to regulate corporations, it was 
in fact regulating individual shareholders—and these shareholders could 
assert their natural rights as citizens against the perceived overreaching of 
the state.41   
Morton Horwitz has convincingly argued that the Supreme Court’s 
famous 1886 decision in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad 
Co.42 represented a shift to the aggregate view of the corporation.  In that 
case, the Court baldly asserted:   
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question 
whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these 
corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.43 
While Horwitz acknowledges that many have characterized Santa Clara as 
a real entity case, he goes on to demonstrate that “a ‘natural entity’ or ‘real 
entity’ theory of the corporation that the Santa Clara case is supposed to 
have adopted was nowhere to be found in American legal thought when the 
case was decided.”44  Furthermore, Horwitz notes that “those who argued 
for the corporation [particularly, John Norton Pomeroy] as well as Supreme 
Court Justice Stephen Field, who decided in favor of the corporation in two 
elaborate circuit court opinions presented below, clearly had no conception 
                                                                                                                 
corporation was to legitimate large scale enterprise and to destroy any special basis for state 
regulation of the corporation that derived from its creation by the state.”). 
 40. Cf. William K. Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election 
of Directors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 467, n.44 (2007) (“[S]hareholders do not own the 
corporation in the traditional sense of the word. Instead they own the residual claim to the 
corporation's income and assets.”); Julian Velasco, Shareholder Ownership and Primacy, 
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 925 (“[C]ommunitarians . . . agree with contractarians that 
shareholders do not own the corporation.”). 
 41. Cf. Miller, supra note 35, at 944 (“[W]ith aggregation theory, the regulatory 
function of the government seems to be on surer footing when the corporate structure 
attempts to externalize costs onto noncontracting parties, such as the public.”). 
 42. 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
 43. Id. at 396. 
 44. HORWITZ, supra note 37, at 67. 
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of a natural entity theory of the corporation.”45  Finally, Horwitz makes 
clear that “when the natural entity theory emerged about a decade later, it 
was only then gradually absorbed into the Santa Clara precedent to 
establish dramatically new constitutional protections for corporations.”46  
Thus, at the time of Santa Clara, “[a]n ‘aggregate’ or ‘partnership’ or 
‘contractual’ vision of the corporation . . . was sufficient to focus the 
conceptual emphasis on the property rights of shareholders.”47  Modern 
nexus-of-contracts theory is understood by many to carry on this aggregate 
theory tradition.48 
C. Seeking the Best of Both Worlds: Real / Natural Entity Theory 
The problem with aggregate theory, however, is that the primary 
theoretical justification for limited liability is the separation of ownership 
from control by way of the statutorily designated overseers of corporate 
activity—the board of directors.49  If one ignores this separation and boils 
the corporation down to its shareholder owners, then one is essentially back 
to a form of general partnership where all the owners are personally liable 
for the debts of the business.50  Thus, the need arose for another theory, and 
real/natural entity theory filled that need by aligning the corporation with 
the board of directors.51  This allowed for the maintenance of limited 
liability for shareholders, while still limiting state regulation.  The 
individual directors, after all, were not some sort of state creation, but rather 
a group of individual citizens.   
                                                                                                                 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Horwitz, supra note 39, at 223. 
 48. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 1025 n.142 (“The point that the nexus of contracts 
theory is a reinvention of the aggregate view has been made repeatedly.”). 
 49. See Thomas C. Folsom, Evaluating Supernatural Law: An Inquiry into the Health of 
Nations (The Restatement of the Obvious, Part II), 21 REGENT U. L. REV. 105, 148 (2008) 
(“Limited liability entities are based on the moral intuition of nonagency because there is 
separation of ownership from control.”). 
 50. See Ron Harris, The Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate 
Personality Theories: From German Codification to British Political Pluralism and 
American Big Business, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1421, 1470 (2006) (“When corporations 
are equated with their shareholders, there is no justification for limiting the access of 
creditors to the private property of these shareholders.”). 
 51. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 560 (2003) (“[T]o the limited extent to which the 
corporation is properly understood as a real entity, it is the board of directors that personifies 
the corporate entity.”).  
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Morton Horwitz argues that the Supreme Court first recognized real 
entity theory in the 1906 case Hale v. Henkel,52 wherein it extended Fourth 
Amendment protection to corporations.53  Ron Harris has similarly noted 
that Hale is “considered the first U.S. Supreme Court case to apply real 
entity theory.”54  Harris notes further that the decision was novel in that 
“the Court protected corporations under the Bill of Rights, rather than the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . it did so on its own initiative; and . . . [it] 
protect[ed] big business from . . . the Sherman Act, the proclaimed purpose 
of which was to check further growth of big business.”55  
D. The Struggle Continues: From Real Entity Back to Aggregate 
1. The Problems with Real Entity Theory 
So, why not just stop with real entity theory and adopt it as the leading 
theory?  One might answer that question by analyzing the three versions of 
real entity theory that Horwitz identified in his Transformation of American 
Law, 1870-1960: the organic view, the representative view, and the 
pragmatic view.56   
According to Horwitz, the organic view traces its roots to German legal 
theorists, including Otto Gierke, who “insist that the distinctiveness of the 
corporate personality is as real as the individuality of a physical person.”57  
This view is problematic because it is arguably too metaphysical for the 
typically “practical-minded and anti-metaphysical American bar.”58  As 
Stephen Bainbridge put it, “I just can't wrap my head around the 
                                                                                                                 
 52. HORWITZ, supra note 37, at 73. 
 53. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906). The Court, however, refused to extend the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to corporations.  Id. at 70 (“The 
amendment is limited to a person who shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself; and if he cannot set up the privilege of a third person, he certainly 
cannot set up the privilege of a corporation.”). 
 54. Harris, supra note 50, at 1472. 
 55. Id. at 1473. I have argued elsewhere that real entity theory (also known as natural 
entity theory) is fairly associated with the more modern theories of director-primacy and 
team-production.  See Padfield, supra note 4, at 835 (arguing that “director-primacy/team-
production theory and ‘real entity’ theory are synonymous”); Stefan J. Padfield, The Dodd-
Frank Corporation: More Than a Nexus of Contracts, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 209, 215 (2011) 
(“[T]he real entity theory arguably captures the director-primacy view of the corporation”). 
 56. HORWITZ, supra note 37, at 101-05. 
 57. Id. at 102. 
 58. Id. at 101. 
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metaphysical abstractions required to think of the corporation as an entity--
real or otherwise--rather than as an aggregate.”59  
The representative view alternatively posits the corporation as “a 
representative democracy governed by majority rule.”60  This conception 
runs into the problem of illusory shareholder democracy, particularly in 
light of the power of the statutorily endowed, and judicially protected, 
board of directors.61  If the state allocates and defends the power 
distribution within the corporate group, then how can real entity theory 
justify limiting the state’s power to regulate corporations on the basis of 
corporations being a real entity reflective of private group dynamics?62  As 
Marc Moore put it: “In spite of their prima facie endogenous and privately-
determined character, the rich contractual dimensions of corporate law in 
the US and UK are ultimately dependent for their effective functioning on 
an underpinning body of laws that . . . are both irremovable and—in large 
part—inadaptable in nature.”63  Thus, “[i]t can therefore reasonably be 
concluded that Anglo-American corporate governance law is, at root, an 
undeniably ‘public’ or regulatory phenomenon.”64 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Stephen Bainbridge, Is the Corporation an Entity? With Application to the 
SCOTUS, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Apr. 4, 2012, 11:05 AM), 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2012/04/is-the-corporation-a-
entity.html. 
 60. HORWITZ, supra note 37, at 102. 
 61. See Elizabeth Pollman, Citizens Not United: The Lack of Stockholder Voluntariness 
in Corporate Political Speech, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 53, 58 (2009), http://www.yalelaw 
journal.org/2009/10/15/pollman.html (“[T]he longstanding concern about the lack of 
stockholder assent to corporate political speech is more compelling than ever.”); Laurence 
H. Tribe, What Should Congress Do About Citizens United?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 24, 2010, 
10:30 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=15469 (“[T]alk of shareholder democracy is 
largely illusory.”). 
 62. Cf. Federico M. Mucciarelli, The Function of Corporate Law and the Effects of 
Reincorporations in the U.S. and the EU, 20 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 421, 423 (2012) 
(“While some scholars hold that the regulatory competition among U.S. states to attract 
incorporations has positive effects upon shareholders' value (‘race to the top’ theory), others 
hold that such competition ultimately leads to a ‘race to the bottom’ or to protection of the 
board's interest at the expense of shareholders and creditors.”).  Compare William L. Cary, 
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) 
(suggesting that state competition for corporate charters has led to a deterioration of 
standards), with Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003) 
(arguing that Delaware is attractive not because of a lenient regulatory framework but, 
among other things, an efficient and knowledgeable judiciary). 
 63. Marc T. Moore, Is Corporate Law ‘Private’ (and Why Does It Matter)?, 30 (Dec. 20, 
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2192163. 
 64. Id. 
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Finally, the pragmatic view simply posits that real entity theory is the 
proper theory of the corporation by default because there are problems with 
aggregate and concession theory in terms of encouraging economic growth 
(e.g., too much liability and regulation) that are solved by real entity 
theory.65  This formulation views the corporate entity as a purely social 
construct.  However, this arguably should empower, rather than limit, 
legislatures.  This conclusion is supported by the fact that Progressives 
apparently embraced the pragmatic/realist version of real entity theory as a 
way of combating the ability of courts to restrict New Deal legislation on 
the basis of arguments rooted in natural rights theory.66   
The sum of all of this may be that real entity theory suffers from too 
many unanswered questions regarding the fundamental battle between those 
who view corporations as essentially private entities and those who view 
them as endowed with sufficient “publicness” to warrant meaningful 
regulation.67  The failure of real entity theorists to resolve this tension 
eventually leads us back to concession versus contract, or at the very least 
simply aligns real entity theory with aggregate theory for purposes of this 
analysis.68 
2. The Contractarian Response 
Some notable landmarks in the modern contract vs. concession “war” 
include the emergence of the law and economics movement in corporate 
                                                                                                                 
 65. HORWITZ, supra note 37, at 105. 
 66. Id. at 105; see also J. Skelly Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and 
the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769, 774 (1971) (“The progressive realists and their 
successors in the 1930's and 1940's, while accepting legal reason as a justification for 
judicial interpretation of the Constitution, believed that its scope was severely limited . . . . 
They viewed the proper role of the courts as extremely circumscribed and subordinate to the 
political branches.”). 
 67. Cf. Padfield, supra note 55, at 210-11 (“Dodd-Frank may also be a game changer in 
the debate over the nature of the corporation. . . . The Act's reaffirmation of the sovereign's 
extensive power to regulate corporations, together with its formal recognition of [too-big-to-
fail], constitute significant negative data points vis-à-vis the currently dominant nexus-of-
contracts theory of the corporation.”); Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1012, 1032-33 (2013) (“Private ordering was always a privilege and that privilege is 
subject to erosion. Government was there from the beginning, allowing private ordering to 
exist. But what is given can be taken away; Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank both prove that 
point.”). 
 68. Cf. Pollman, supra note 25, at 1663 (“[T]he real entity theory is incomplete in that it 
fails to illuminate why the entity should receive constitutional protection as a person and 
what the scope of that protection should be.”). 
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law in the 1970s,69 which reinvigorated contractarians;70 the application of 
aggregate/contractarian principles in Buckley v. Valeo in 1976,71 wherein 
“the Court relied on aggregate theory and refused to restrict corporate 
political speech, finding that such restrictions would affect the freedom of 
association of the individuals that form a corporation”;72 and the successful 
resistance of that movement in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 
in 1990,73 followed by the movement’s arguable triumphant ascendance in 
Citizens United.74  Given that the Court’s current composition leaves little 
hope for concession theory’s resurrection on the judicial front in the near 
future, the relevant combatants have turned their attention to the legislative 
front.75    
To the extent that conceptualizing corporations as associations of 
individuals undermines limited liability, modern contractarian analysis 
                                                                                                                 
 69. See Petrin, supra note 13, at 13 n.64 (“Roughly between the late 1920s and 1970s, 
scholars were reluctant to resolve practical legal questions by deducing solutions from 
corporate theories. Yet, the debate revived with the rise of modern economic theories of the 
firm.”) (citations omitted). 
 70. Cf. Robert J. Rhee, Tort Arbitrage, 60 FLA. L. REV. 125, 136, 153-54 (2008) (“The 
prevailing economic theories of tort law and bargaining are linked by a common analysis 
and intellectual history. Both theories came to prominence in the early 1970s with influential 
articles by leading law-and-economics scholars, and they aspire to efficiency through cost 
minimization. . . . The corporation, which in the law-and-economics canon is not an entity so 
much as a ‘nexus of contracts,’ exists to allow investors to diversify business risk and 
participate in the broader economy, which must include the activities that yield accidents.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 71. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 72. Petrin, supra note 13, at 15 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22). 
 73. 494 U.S. 652 (1990); see Morrissey, supra note 15, at 807 (noting that in Citizens 
United, “Justice Stevens pointed out that the Austin case . . . described the firm as a grantee 
of concessions from the state”). 
 74. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see Padfield, supra note 55, at 224 
(“The [Citizens United] majority viewed the corporation as fundamentally little more than an 
association of citizens.”).  But see Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 1040 (“What is remarkable 
about Citizens United . . . is that both the majority and the dissent adopted the real entity 
view of the corporation, so that their only disagreement was in divergent assessments of the 
implications for the First Amendment.”); Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate 
Law Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 497, 505 (2011) (“The majority in Citizens United employed both the 
aggregation-of-rights and entity theory of corporations to reach its conclusion that corporate 
political speech is to be treated the same an individual political speech.”). 
 75. See Ronald J. Colombo, The Corporation as a Tocquevillian Association, 85 TEMP. 
L. REV. 1, 25 n.180 (2012) (“[S]ome in Congress have pushed for legislation that would 
purportedly circumvent Citizens United, and some have even called for a constitutional 
amendment to reverse the decision.”). 
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arguably solves this problem in at least two ways.  First, it simply denies 
the importance of limited liability as a statutorily bestowed benefit of 
corporateness.76  In terms of case precedent, one might here cite the 1976 
Supreme Court case Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc.,77 for the proposition that the arrival of a listeners’ 
rights justification for striking down regulation of corporate speech 
furthered this aspect of the contractarian agenda by shifting our attention 
away from the corporation entirely.78  Second, modern contractarian 
analysis advances the normative conclusion that states should do that which 
maximizes economic growth and efficiency.79  Thus, because granting 
limited liability to business associations furthers those goals, the presence 
or absence of viable theoretical justifications for limited liability is 
irrelevant.80    
Having thus traced the course of corporate theory to demonstrate how we 
got to the point where, post-Citizens United, concession theory has been 
marginalized at best, the next section of this Essay attempts to explain why 
we nonetheless should take concession theory seriously. 
III. Demonstrating the Viability of Concession Theory by Responding to the 
Arguments Against It 
This Part addresses four arguments frequently advanced to undermine 
concession theory: (1) that corporate theory is excessively malleable; (2) 
that concession theory died along with special charters; (3) that listeners’ 
                                                                                                                 
 76. See Ribstein, supra note 27, at 82, 83 (rejecting “the conception of limited liability 
as a state-conferred privilege” and explaining that this is important because “recognition of 
limited liability as the product of private ordering compels acceptance of the contract theory 
of the corporation”). 
 77. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).  
 78. See TAMARA R. PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: COMMERCIAL 
EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 18 (2012) (noting that Virginia Pharmacy, which created the 
commercial speech doctrine, “was also novel because it focused on the listeners' 
(consumers') rights to hear rather than on the speakers' (pharmacies') right to speak”). 
 79. Cf. Robin Bradley Kar, The Deep Structure of Law and Morality, 84 TEX. L. REV. 
877, 925 (2006) (“[A] number of economists, including Richard Posner, have argued that 
adopting a fundamentally contractarian decision procedure will, in fact, result in a standard 
that requires us to maximize efficiency . . . .”). 
 80. Nonetheless, just as the Citizens United dissent may have been incentivized to avoid 
expressly adopting concession theory due to the disdain with which that theory is regarded 
by at least some meaningful population of the relevant experts, the majority may have been 
incentivized to avoid expressly adopting aggregate theory due to the implications for limited 
liability discussed above. 
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rights trump corporate theory; and (4) that the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine trumps concession theory.  I hope to show that none of these 
arguments creates an insurmountable obstacle for the application of 
concession theory. 
A. The Argument That Corporate Theory Is Excessively Malleable 
One criticism of my proposal to rehabilitate concession theory is that 
examination of all corporate theories is futile because they lack meaningful 
predictive power.  For example,  
In 1926, John Dewey published an article in the Yale Law 
Journal in which he dismisses as irrelevant the debate among the 
aggregate, artificial entity, and real entity views of the 
corporation. These views, he explains, could be deployed to suit 
any purpose; and he uses examples relying on the cyclical nature 
of these theories. His conclusion is that theory should be 
abandoned for an examination of reality.81 
However, in 1992 Morton Horwitz responded to this criticism with the 
following: 
I wish to dispute Dewey’s conclusion that particular conceptions 
of corporate personality were used just as easily to limit as to 
enhance corporate power. I hope to show that, for example, the 
rise of a natural entity theory of the corporation was a major 
factor in legitimating big business and that none of the other 
theoretical alternatives could provide as much sustenance to 
newly organized, concentrated enterprise.82 
To the extent Horwitz achieved his goal,83 it may well be the better view 
that while corporate theory may not be able to precisely predict outcomes in 
all cases, it is nonetheless meaningful in terms of eliminating certain 
conclusions and allocating burdens. 
Another aspect of this argument against the utility of corporate theory is 
the assertion that a functional approach is better.  For example, Horwitz 
noted that “[t]he Legal Realists, in general, succeeded in persuading legal 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 1022-23 (citing John Dewey, The Historical 
Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 673 (1926)). 
 82. HORWITZ, supra note 37, at 68. 
 83. Cf. Harris, supra note 50, at 1469 (“Morton Horwitz convincingly contended that 
Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co. was a grand application of contract 
theory . . . .”). 
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thinkers that highly abstract and general legal conceptions were simply part 
of what Felix Cohen, quoting Von Jehring, derisively called ‘the heaven of 
legal concepts.’ Only more concrete statements of functional relations, 
Cohen argued, were useful in deciding legal questions.”84  This challenge 
continues to resonate with scholars to the present day.  For example, Martin 
Petrin recently posted a paper on SSRN85 wherein he argues: 
[A] legal entity should be viewed simply as a tool by which the 
legislature has chosen to enable individuals to pursue certain 
collective (or, in the case of a one-man-company, individual) 
goals in a more effective and convenient manner.  Beyond this 
definition, law—in contrast perhaps to sociology or 
philosophy—does not need to assess the nature of the firm. 
Viewed this way, legal entities have those rights and duties 
which legislators and courts find it to have. In turn, these rights 
and duties should flow from what the firm is meant to achieve 
and how it affects society.86  
However, while it seems perfectly reasonable to include a functional 
analysis when making determinations about corporate rights and 
responsibilities, this does not necessarily translate into corporate theory 
being irrelevant.  This can be demonstrated by examining Petrin’s 
application of the functional approach.  Petrin argues: 
[I]f, as some scholars now convincingly argue, asset partitioning 
and limited liability are the firm’s core function, attempts and 
concepts to weaken them should be carefully scrutinized in light 
of their potential benefits. Hence, veil piercing and proposals to 
introduce certain forms of “unlimited” shareholder liability tend 
                                                                                                                 
 84. HORWITZ, supra note 37, at 68 (quoting Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense 
and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 809 (1935)). 
     85.  “[The] Social Science Research Network (SSRN) is a world wide collaborative of 
over 233,000 authors and more than 1.7 million users that is devoted to the rapid worldwide 
dissemination of social science research.” Frequently Asked Questions, SOC. SCI. RES. 
NETWORK, http://www.ssrn.com/update/general/ssrn_faq.html#what_is (last visited Oct. 14, 
2013). 
 86. Petrin, supra note 13, at 43; see also Pollman, supra note 25, at 1631 (“[A] 
metaphor or philosophical conception of the corporation is not helpful for the type of 
functional analysis that the Court should conduct. The Court should consider the purpose of 
the constitutional right at issue, and whether it would promote the objectives of that right to 
provide it to the corporation--and thereby to the people underlying the corporation.”). 
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to be difficult to reconcile with a functional view of 
corporations.87 
This analysis, however, seems to beg the question whether a corporation’s 
core function can be sufficiently defined without some reference to its 
nature.   
If the core function is a result of legislative fiat, as concession theory 
would posit, then veil piercing and unlimited shareholder liability may be 
consistent with that function if the state has some greater overarching 
purpose that is satisfied via those mechanisms.  For example, the legislature 
may conclude that encouraging lenders to extend credit efficiently may 
require granting lenders some meaningful ability to hold shareholders 
directly liable for corporate debts.  Deference to this conclusion would be 
consistent with concession theory but not with aggregate theory, because 
aggregate theory would arguably posit the core function as resulting from 
private agreement and limit the government’s ability to interfere with those 
arrangements.  
Given the relevance of corporate theory in the foregoing analysis, one 
may also question whether a purely functional analysis is preferable if it 
fails to advance the discussion meaningfully beyond where corporate theory 
has already brought us.  Here again, one may examine Petrin’s functional 
analysis: 
Second, prima facie, a legal entity’s rights (constitutional, 
statutory, and common law) should reflect its core economic 
function and purpose. For instance, it is justifiable to protect 
corporate commercial speech—although there may be limits—in 
order to increase sales of products.  Beyond this obvious case, a 
legal entity may also be given other rights, including rights to 
privacy, political speech, and even religious rights, albeit on the 
preliminary condition that there is a sufficiently strong link to its 
economic goals.88 
This analysis bears a striking resemblance to then-Justice Rehnquist’s 
theory of the corporation in Bellotti, which I have previously aligned with 
concession theory: 
Justice Rehnquist's stand-alone dissent in Bellotti provides 
arguably the sole example in these opinions of a Justice 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Petrin, supra note 13, at 44 (citations omitted). 
 88. Id. at 44-45.  
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affirmatively adopting a theory of the corporation for purposes 
of determining the constitutional rights of corporations--though 
not via the express adoption of one of the traditionally 
recognized theories. Specifically, Justice Rehnquist relied on 
Justice Marshall's Dartmouth College opinion to conclude that: 
“Since it cannot be disputed that the mere creation of a 
corporation does not invest it with all the liberties enjoyed by 
natural persons . . . our inquiry must seek to determine which 
constitutional protections are ‘incidental to its very existence.’” 
Thus, while it may be true that “a corporation's right of 
commercial speech . . . might be considered necessarily 
incidental to the business of a commercial corporation[, i]t 
cannot be so readily concluded that the right of political 
expression is equally necessary to carry out the functions of a 
corporation organized for commercial purposes.”89 
Given that a purely functional analysis may either be incomplete without 
corporate theory or merely overlap with corporate theory, it seems difficult 
to conclude that the availability of a functional analysis, whatever its utility, 
should translate into a complete avoidance of corporate theory when 
conducting legal analysis.  
B. The Argument That Concession Theory Died Along with Special 
Charters 
The story of the evolution of corporate theory set forth in Part II is 
incomplete.  It was not enough for the proponents of corporate growth to 
simply posit new theories to justify limiting state oversight of corporations.  
Rather, concession theory itself had to be undermined.  The argument goes 
roughly as follows.  
As we moved from a special charter system of incorporation to a system 
based upon enabling acts, which required little more than a simple filing for 
practically any person who desired to incorporate to do so, the notion that 
some special grant was being conveyed lost some of its luster.90  In 
addition, doctrines that allowed states to keep a tight grip on their 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Padfield, supra note 4, at 853 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765, 824-25 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). 
 90. See Dibadj, supra note 6, at 757 (“The conventional wisdom is that ‘[v]iewing the 
corporation as a concession from the state is a relic of a time before incorporating became a 
mere administrative formality’--after all, the move from special incorporation statutes to 
general incorporation statutes seems to minimize the state's role.”) (quoting Pollman, supra 
note 25, at 1630). 
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corporations began to crumble, including the ultra vires doctrine and 
doctrines related to the regulation of foreign (out-of-state) corporations.91  
However, as I have stated elsewhere, Grant Hayden and Matthew Bodie 
offer a superior analysis by arguing that the fact that government 
permission is required to incorporate supports the legitimacy of state 
regulation, regardless of how freely such permission is granted.92  While not 
universally accepted,93 this essential concept that corporations cannot be 
created solely via private contracting has been espoused by some of the 
most highly-regarded scholars in corporate law, including Henry Hansmann 
and Reinier Kraakman,94 as well as Margaret Blair95—to name just a few.96  
Add to this “the ubiquity of reserve clauses in corporate codes, the 
existence of stakeholder statutes, and relatively recent judicial 
pronouncements that ‘[c]orporations are creatures of the Legislature,’”97—
                                                                                                                 
 91. See Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of Corporate Groups: Corporate Identity 
Reconceived, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 879, 893 (2012) (“By the late 1800s, New Jersey, and 
later other states, began to enact general incorporation statutes that facilitated the growth of 
for-profit corporations. In time, the removal of many of the public welfare limits from state 
corporate codes and the ultimate decline of the ultra vires doctrine rendered the concession 
view largely obsolete.”). 
 92. See Padfield, supra note 4, at 841-42 (citing Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, 
The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of “Nexus of Contracts” Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
1127, 1130 (2011)). 
 93. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 27, at 82-83 (rejecting “the conception of limited 
liability as a state-conferred privilege” and explaining that this is important because 
“recognition of limited liability as the product of private ordering compels acceptance of the 
contract theory of the corporation”). 
 94. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational 
Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000) (“[T]he essential role of all forms of organizational law 
is to provide for the creation of a pattern of creditors' rights—a form of ‘asset partitioning'—
that could not practicably be established otherwise.”). 
 95. Margaret M. Blair, The Four Functions of Corporate Personhood, 4 (Vanderbilt 
Univ. Law Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 12-15, 2012), available at 
http:// ssrn.com/abstract=2037356 (“The four functions that legal entity status serve would 
be very difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish using only transactional contracts.”). 
 96. See, e.g., Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Oscar Gelderblom, Joost Jonker & Enrico 
Perotti, The Emergence of the Corporate Form (1 Amsterdam Ctr. for L. & Econ., Working 
Paper No. 2013-02, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2223905 (analyzing “the 
emergence of the legal innovations that generated the . . . corporate form” and concluding, 
among other things, that “the creation of legal personality for private business required an 
active role for the legislator”). 
 97. Padfield, supra note 55, at 218.  In Neary v. Miltronics Mfg. Servs., Inc., the district 
court wrote: “‘Corporations are creatures of the Legislature. It is from this body that they 
derive their life, as well as the terms and conditions of their existence.  It is appropriate, 
therefore, that the terms and conditions of their existence be determined by that body.’”  534 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
348 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:327 
 
 
and, “I would go so far as to label the argument that concession theory is 
necessarily tied to our special charter era a straw man.”98 
Furthermore, as Lyman Johnson notes, “It is important to modern 
theoretical understandings of corporate personhood to remember that the 
‘artificial being’ and ‘mere creatures of law’ language from the 1819 
decision in Dartmouth College has never been renounced.”99  Specifically, 
Johnson points out that “[i]n 1987, 160 years after the Dartmouth College 
decision, the Supreme Court expressly invoked the language in a landmark 
decision, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, upholding Indiana's 
antitakeover statute against constitutional attack.”100  Based on the 
foregoing, Johnson concludes: “The Supreme Court's pointed use of the 
Dartmouth College language in the CTS decision suggests that Professor 
Horwitz was premature in asserting that the ‘grant’ theory of 
corporateness . . . had eroded by the late-nineteenth century.”101 
 Thus, it seems fair to say that the legislative choice to move away 
from special charters and loosen other restrictions on corporations should 
not be equated with the demise of concession theory.  As Hillary Sale has 
noted, “Private ordering was always a privilege and that privilege is subject 
to erosion. Government was there from the beginning, allowing private 
ordering to exist. But what is given can be taken away . . . .”102 
  
                                                                                                                 
F. Supp. 2d 227, 231 (D.N.H. 2008) (quoting Alkire v. Interstate Theatres Corp., 379 F. 
Supp. 1210, 1214 (D. Mass. 1974)). 
 98. Id.  
 99. Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate Responsibility: 
Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1148 (2012). 
 100. Id. (citing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987)).  “The 
Indiana statute, like many of that era, was shrewdly embedded in the Indiana corporation 
statute to curb rampant takeover activity of the 1980s that, rightly or wrongly, was widely 
thought to be socially harmful.”  Id. 
 101. Id. (citing HORWITZ, supra note 37, at 72). 
 102. Sale, supra note 67, at 1032-33; cf. D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright & Marcus 
Kai Hintze, Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 127 n.12 
(2011) (“Consistent with the most common usage in corporate law scholarship, we use the 
term ‘private ordering’ as a near synonym for ‘contracting’ or ‘transacting.’ Some legal 
scholars use ‘private ordering’ to connote a ‘delegation of regulatory authority to private 
actors.’”) (citations omitted). 
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C. The Argument That Listeners’ Rights Trump Corporate Theory 
Many commentators have concluded that Citizens United was decided on 
the basis of a listeners’ rights rationale.103  The listeners’ rights rationale 
provides an alternative basis for protecting speech under the First 
Amendment.  Particularly relevant to our discussion here, it shifts the focus 
of the analysis away from the speaker and onto the listeners.104  The idea is 
that one of the First Amendment’s purposes is to protect the marketplace of 
ideas, which is particularly relevant to the proper functioning of a 
democracy when political speech is at issue.105  Of course, the notion that 
markets function best when left unregulated has been seriously challenged 
in recent years.106  
However, even if one understands the Citizens United opinion to be 
fundamentally about listeners’ rights, there remains the question whether 
there is something about corporations that would justify including them in 
the line of cases carving out exceptions for particular identity-based 
restrictions on speech.107  For example, in United States Civil Service 
Commission v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, the Supreme Court upheld 
                                                                                                                 
 103. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 2, at 339 (“Justice Kennedy's focus on the 
importance of unrestricted corporate electoral speech to self-government hinges on his belief 
that such communications provide important information for voters.”). 
 104. Cf. PIETY, supra note 78, at 18 (noting that Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), which created the 
commercial speech doctrine, “was also novel because it focused on the listeners' 
(consumers') rights to hear rather than on the speakers' (pharmacies') right to speak”). 
 105. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010) (stating that “[p]olitical 
speech is ‘indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy’”) (citations omitted). 
 106. See Miriam A. Cherry, Morality and Markets: A Comment on Predicting Crime, 52 
ARIZ. L. REV. 73, 74 (2010) (“[T]he worldwide financial crisis has made faith in the 
rationality of unregulated markets seem rather naïve.”); see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian 
Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown 
of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613, 1619 (2009) (“Modern financial regulation emerged from 
the recognition that financial crises are inevitable in an unregulated market . . . .”). Cf. 
Robert L. Kerr, What Justice Powell and Adam Smith Could Have Told the Citizens United 
Majority About Other People's Money, 9 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 211, 226 (2010) (“In 
rejecting Austin's structural mechanism for preventing deployment of ‘resources amassed in 
the economic marketplace’ through state-created benefits of the corporate form to obtain ‘an 
unfair advantage in the political marketplace,’ Citizens United advances an understanding of 
a laissez-faire marketplace of ideas. The Citizens United majority, however, . . . diverged 
from an understanding of marketplace freedom that Adam Smith would endorse . . . .”). 
 107. Cf. Moore, supra note 63, at 3 (“In short—in law as in elsewhere—ought 
judgements are ultimately dependent to a large extent on is judgements, because in order to 
be able to critically evaluate a subject we must first of all understand its key attributes and 
qualities.”). 
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a federal statute that prohibited federal employees from taking “‘an active 
part in political management or in political campaigns.’”108  The Court 
upheld the statute despite the fact that its prohibitions clearly infringed 
upon the federal employees’ “right to speak, to propose, to publish, to 
petition Government, to assemble.”109   
The Supreme Court’s justifications for the identity-based restriction on 
speech in Letter Carriers included (1) preserving “the impartial execution 
of the laws” by making it illegal for federal employees “to play substantial 
roles in partisan political campaigns, and . . . run for office on partisan 
political tickets,” (2) avoiding the appearance of “political justice,” which 
must be avoided “if confidence in the system of representative Government 
is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent,” (3) ensuring that “the rapidly 
expanding Government work force should not be employed to build a 
powerful, invincible, and perhaps corrupt political machine,” and (4) 
furthering “the goal that employment and advancement in the Government 
service not depend on political performance.”110  Anyone with even a 
passing familiarity with the Citizens United decision will likely recognize 
these justifications as surprisingly similar to those rejected as a basis for 
regulating corporate speech in that case.111   
Nor is Letter Carriers the only case wherein the Court has upheld 
identity-based restrictions on speech based on justifications so deferential to 
legislative determinations.  In Parker v. Levy, the Supreme Court upheld 
restrictions on the speech of military personnel because, among other 
things, failure to do so could “‘directly affect the capacity of the 
                                                                                                                 
 108. 413 U.S. 548, 550 (1973) (quoting § 9(a) of the Hatch Act (then codified at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 7324(a)(2))). 
 109. Id. at 597 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 579 (“The section of the 
regulations which purports to state the partisan acts that are proscribed . . . forbids . . . the 
endorsement of ‘a partisan candidate for public office or political party office in a political 
advertisement, a broadcast, campaign literature, or similar material,’ and . . . prohibits 
‘[a]ddressing a convention, caucus, rally, or similar gathering of a political party in support 
of or in opposition to a partisan candidate for public office or political party office.’”) (citing 
5 C.F.R. § 733.112). 
 110. Id. at 565-66. 
 111. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 448 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he majority's apparent belief that quid pro quo arrangements can be neatly demarcated 
from other improper influences does not accord with the theory or reality of politics. It 
certainly does not accord with the record Congress developed in passing BCRA, a record 
that stands as a remarkable testament to the energy and ingenuity with which corporations, 
unions, lobbyists, and politicians may go about scratching each other's backs--and which 
amply supported Congress' determination to target a limited set of especially destructive 
practices.”). 
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Government to discharge its responsibilities.’”112  Furthermore, in Jones v. 
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc.,  the Court upheld identity-
based restrictions on the speech rights of prisoners because, among other 
things, “‘courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent 
problems of prison administration and reform.’”113  The Court went on to 
explain that “[j]udicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a 
healthy sense of realism.”114  Finally, in Bethel School District No. 403 v. 
Fraser, the Court upheld identity-based restrictions on otherwise protected 
speech by high school students in recognition of, among other things, “the 
objectives of public education as the ‘inculcat[ion of] fundamental values 
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.’”115 
The Citizens United majority was well aware of this line of cases 
upholding identity-based speech restrictions, but dismissed them as 
irrelevant by simply asserting that “[t]he corporate independent 
expenditures at issue in this case . . . would not interfere with governmental 
functions, so these cases are inapposite. These precedents stand only for the 
proposition that there are certain governmental functions that cannot 
operate without some restrictions on particular kinds of speech.”116  The 
dissent, however, retorted that:  
The majority's creative suggestion that these cases stand only for 
that one proposition is quite implausible. In any event, the 
proposition lies at the heart of this case, as Congress and half the 
state legislatures have concluded, over many decades, that their 
core functions of administering elections and passing legislation 
                                                                                                                 
 112. 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974) (quoting United States v. Priest, 21 C.M.A. 564, 570 
(1972)). 
 113. 433 U.S. 119, 126 (1977) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 
(1974)). 
 114. Id. (quoting Procunier, 416 U.S. at 405); cf. id. at 128 (“[T]he burden was not on 
appellants to show affirmatively that the Union would be ‘detrimental to proper penological 
objectives’ or would constitute a ‘present danger to security and order.’ Rather, ‘[s]uch 
considerations are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections 
officials . . . .’”) (quoting N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union v. Jones, 409 F. Supp. 937, 944-45 
(E.D.N.C. 1976), and  Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)). 
 115. 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)); 
cf. id. at 686 (“I wish therefore, . . . to disclaim any purpose . . . to hold that the Federal 
Constitution compels the teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender control 
of the American public school system to public school students.”) (quoting Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 526 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting)). 
 116. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010). 
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cannot operate effectively without some narrow restrictions on 
corporate electioneering paid for by general treasury funds.117 
However, in spite of the majority’s awareness of these cases and the 
dissent’s at least partial reliance on them, and despite the apparent difficulty 
of determining the applicability of these cases without expressly concluding 
what corporations are, the Citizens United majority avoided any express 
discussion of corporate theory and the dissent expressly disavowed any role 
therefore.118   
Nonetheless, commentators quickly identified an important role for 
corporate theory in the decision,119 and I have previously written about how 
this failure to expressly discuss corporate theory in relevant cases creates a 
legitimacy problem for the Court.120  Accordingly, the mere existence of a 
listeners’ rights rationale for cases like Citizens United does not preclude a 
role for corporate theory in general, or concession theory in particular.121  In 
fact, its viability as any sort of a trump card arguably requires an analysis of 
what corporations are.122  As Darrell Miller notes: 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Id. at 421 n.46 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 
U.S. 765, 804 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (“[A]n examination of the First Amendment 
values that corporate expression furthers and the threat to the functioning of a free society it 
is capable of posing reveals that it is not fungible with communications emanating from 
individuals and is subject to restrictions which individual expression is not.”). 
 118. Id. at 465-66 n.72 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in this analysis turns on 
whether the corporation is conceptualized as a grantee of a state concession, a nexus of 
explicit and implicit contracts, a mediated hierarchy of stakeholders, or any other recognized 
model.”) (citations omitted). 
 119. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 10. 
 120. See Padfield, supra note 4. 
 121. Cf. Padfield, supra note 55, at 227 (“Daniel Greenwood's argument that 
corporations could pursue goals that no individual living human being desired (and that 
might in fact be harmful to human beings) because the relevant decision-makers were legally 
required to follow the dictates of a fictional shareholder, could implicate the question of 
whether corporations should fall within that narrow class of speech restrictions justified on 
the basis of identity due to ‘an interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their 
functions.’”) (citing Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are 
Corporate Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1093-94 (1996)); Hersh 
Shefrin, Building on Kahneman’s Insights in the Development of Behavioral Finance, 44 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1401, 1404 (2013) (“Economic theory . . . tells us that the representative 
investor resulting from the market mix might not look anything like a real person.”). 
 122. There are, however, other means of overcoming the listeners’ rights rationale for 
limiting regulation of speech.  For example, the Court itself noted that national security 
interests could provide the necessary compelling interest to limit the speech of foreign 
corporations.  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 362 (“We need not reach the question 
whether the Government has a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or 
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[O]ne must consider the consequences of the Court's attempt to 
dodge corporate personhood, by focusing, Citizens United-style, 
on the scope of the right, rather than on the party asserting it. . . . 
[A]ttempting to sidestep the corporate form by focusing on the 
right simply assumes the equivalence of the corporate person and 
the natural person.123 
In other words, the Court cannot avoid corporate theory, because by its very 
rulings it adopts one theory or another.  The only question is whether it will 
continue to deny this reality or discuss the issue openly.124  
D. The Argument That the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Trumps 
Concession Theory 
One of the challenges the Citizens United majority posed to those who 
would base regulation of corporate political speech on the unique state-
granted privileges of corporate status, is the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions.125  Kathleen Sullivan describes the doctrine, which was 
introduced by the Lochner court,126 as follows: 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that 
government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the 
beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the 
government may withhold that benefit altogether. It reflects the 
triumph of the view that government may not do indirectly what 
it may not do directly over the view that the greater power to 
                                                                                                                 
associations from influencing our Nation's political process.  Section 441b is not limited to 
corporations or associations that were created in foreign countries or funded predominately 
by foreign shareholders.  Section 441b therefore would be overbroad even if we assumed, 
arguendo, that the Government has a compelling interest in limiting foreign influence over 
our political process.”) (citations omitted). 
 123. Miller, supra note 35, at 943. 
 124. Cf. SEGALL, supra note 4, at 2-3 (“[B]ecause judges are governmental officials who 
exercise coercive power, it is important that they explain their legal decisions with honesty 
and transparency.”). 
 125. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 351 (“‘It is rudimentary that the State cannot exact 
as the price of those special advantages [of corporate status] the forfeiture of First 
Amendment rights.’”) (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 126. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1416 
(1989) (“The Lochner Court first fashioned the doctrine.”). 
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deny a benefit includes the lesser power to impose a condition on 
its receipt. 127 
In light of the foregoing, the Citizens United Court said the following in 
the course of rejecting Austin: 
Either as support for its antidistortion rationale or as a further 
argument, the Austin majority undertook to distinguish wealthy 
individuals from corporations on the ground that “[s]tate law 
grants corporations special advantages—such as limited liability, 
perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and 
distribution of assets.” This does not suffice, however, to allow 
laws prohibiting speech. “It is rudimentary that the State cannot 
exact as the price of those special advantages the forfeiture of 
First Amendment rights.”128 
Given the lack of additional analysis, it is unclear whether we should view 
this statement as constituting binding precedent on the issue.  And even if 
one reads the passage as carrying such weight, the change in the 
composition of the Court since Citizens United suggests the issue remains 
up for grabs.  After all, the principal formulation of the rule set forth above 
is taken from Justice Scalia’s dissent in Austin.129   
Were the Court to directly confront the issue, there are at least five good 
reasons to conclude that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine would not 
constitute an insurmountable obstacle to the viability of concession theory.  
First, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine’s scope and applicability 
remains ill-defined.  For example, Philip Hamburger has stated: 
“Unconstitutional conditions are a conundrum . . . a sort of Gordian 
knot.”130  And Derek E. Bambauer has noted that “unconstitutional 
conditions cases are a nearly impenetrable murk--scholarly analysis 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Id. at 1415; cf. Miller, supra note 35, at 920-21 (“In sum, the artificial entity theory 
is enervated, but it is not extinct.  It is a doctrinal device that the Court uses to justify 
regulation of corporations to a degree different than individuals.  Because a corporation 
could not exist but for state law, the state may burden its activity to a greater degree than it 
could an individual human being.  This ‘greater includes the lesser’ rationale is neither 
ironclad nor uncontroversial, but it exists.”) (citing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH 
THE STATE 113-15 (1993)). 
 128. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 350-51 (citations omitted) (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 
658-59; id. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 129. Austin, 494 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 130. Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 VA. 
L. REV. 479, 479, 480 (2012). 
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struggles to reconcile conflicting precedent and tends to surrender 
descriptive analysis in favor of prescriptive recommendations for future 
development.”131  Thus, while it is certainly possible that the Court would 
interpret the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to essentially undermine 
concession theory, it is by no means certain that it will. 
Second, it is unclear what exactly would be added to the relevant 
analysis by applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine because, like 
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment itself, it does not actually 
constitute a complete bar to government action, but rather requires the 
government to satisfy some form of heightened scrutiny.132  Thus, the 
analysis could proceed as follows:  
(1) The government’s restriction of corporate political speech is subject 
to strict scrutiny; 
(2) The government can satisfy strict scrutiny in part because under 
concession theory corporations are deemed to be state-created entities 
granted unique privileges designed to benefit society as a whole, but also 
subject to unique potential for abuse.  This combination of state-conferred 
benefits and potential for abuse supports restricting the ability of 
corporations to influence the political process by spending shareholders’ 
money on political speech;  
(3) However, justifying the limitation of corporate political speech on the 
basis of concession theory essentially constitutes conditioning the benefit of 
operating in the corporate form on the surrender of free speech rights.  This 
implicates the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and thus subjects the 
regulation to strict scrutiny;133  
(4) Return to (1) above.  
Third, even if applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine warrants 
a distinct analysis, once the corporation is characterized as a state-granted 
concession one is much closer to the facts of Regan v. Taxation with 
Representation of Washington (TWR).134  In TWR, the Court held that 
                                                                                                                 
 131. Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863, 914 (2012). 
 132. Cf. Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil 
Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1678 (2009) (“The unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
has been criticized for being inconsistent and incoherent, but it clearly reflects that even 
‘consensual’ waivers of constitutional rights can threaten the First Amendment and trigger 
heightened scrutiny.”). 
 133. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is rudimentary that the State 
cannot exact as the price of those special advantages the forfeiture of First Amendment 
rights.”). 
 134. 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
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conditioning the benefits of 501(c)(3) tax-status on the beneficiary 
corporation limiting its lobbying activities to separate entities was 
allowable because “Congress has merely refused to pay for [TWR’s] 
lobbying.”135  As Ellen Aprill explains: “In the view of the Court, such a 
selective subsidy did not impose an unconstitutional condition on the 
exercise of First Amendment rights.”136   
Following the logic of TWR, one could argue that the size of a 
corporation’s cash vault is a function of the special privileges granted by 
the state.  In other words, there is little economic difference between the 
government (a) directly giving the corporation $100, (b) reducing the 
corporation’s tax bill by $100, and (c) allowing the corporation to raise 
$100 from shareholders, because those shareholders would never have 
invested the $100 were it not for the limited liability, free transferability of 
shares, centralized management, entity immortality, etc., granted to the 
corporation by the state.  Thus, one could argue that the justification that 
allows the government to restrict the political speech of 501(c)(3) 
corporations could justify restricting the political speech of all corporations. 
Of course, the leap from examples (a) and (b) to (c) above is not 
insignificant, and there are certainly good reasons not to make it.  In 
addition, the viability of TWR itself has been called into question by 
Citizens United, because at least part of the rationale for allowing the 
condition in TWR was the availability of other entities, such as political 
action committees (PACs), which could serve as conduits for the 
organization’s political speech—a rationale that Citizens United expressly 
rejected.137  However, Ellen Aprill has concluded that “Citizens United has 
not sub silentio overturned TWR,”138 and in light of the overall uncertainty 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Id. at 545. 
 136. Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt 
Organizations After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 363, 365 (2011). 
 137. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (“A PAC is a separate association 
from the corporation. So the PAC exemption from § 441b's expenditure ban . . . does not 
allow corporations to speak.  Even if a PAC could somehow allow a corporation to speak—
and it does not—the option to form PACs does not alleviate the First Amendment problems 
with § 441b.  PACs are burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to administer and 
subject to extensive regulations.”). 
 138. Aprill, supra note 136, at 365; see also Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open 
Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2328-29 (2013) (citing TWR approvingly for the 
proposition that the availability of a “dual structure” to permit lobbying saved statute from 
running afoul of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine).  But see id. at 2334 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]hat fact . . . was entirely nonessential to the Court's holding.”). 
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surrounding the unconstitutional conditions doctrine the corporation-as-
subsidy argument is at least worth considering.139 
Fourth, the unconstitutional conditions analysis can turn on the 
germaneness of the condition to the purpose of the regulation.140  For 
example, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,  Justice Scalia, 
writing for the majority, concluded that California could not condition a 
building permit on the conveyance of an easement:  
The evident constitutional propriety disappears, however, if the 
condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further 
the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition. . . . 
[T]he lack of nexus between the condition and the original 
purpose of the building restriction converts that purpose to 
something other than what it was. The purpose then becomes, 
quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some valid 
governmental purpose, but without payment of 
compensation . . . . In short, unless the permit condition serves 
the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the 
building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but “an 
out-and-out plan of extortion.”141 
However, in our case the requirement of germaneness may not be that 
difficult to satisfy. Once we take concession theory as our starting point (as 
we must if we are analyzing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as a 
form of rebuttal to concession theory) we can view the purpose of 
conditioning corporate status on limited corporate political speech as 
having an “essential nexus” to the conceptualization of the corporation as a 
state concession.  After all, that conceptualization has seemingly from the 
beginning included a fear of undue political influence.142   
                                                                                                                 
 139. Open Society, supra note 138, was issued shortly before this Essay was to be 
published.  The implications of the Court’s apparent flip-flopping on the issue of whether the 
availability of speech by an alternative entity alleviates First Amendment concerns in the 
TWR, Citizens United, and Open Society cases certainly warrants further examination. 
 140. But see Open Soc’y, 133 S. Ct. at 2328 (“In some cases, a funding condition can 
result in an unconstitutional burden on First Amendment rights. . . . The dissent thinks that 
can only be true when the condition is not relevant to the objectives of the program . . .  or 
when the condition is actually coercive . . . . Our precedents, however, are not so limited.”). 
 141. 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (quoting J. E. D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 
14-15 (N.H. 1981)). 
 142. See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 407, 459 n.272 (2006) (“[C]oncession theory originated as a theory of the firm that was 
used to limit corporate powers out of fear.”). 
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It is interesting to note that shifting the focus to unconstitutional 
conditions may actually require courts to focus on the nature of the 
corporate speaker.  Michael Boardman noted in a related context that: 
Framing the case of government contractors in the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine rather than traditional First 
Amendment analysis might also better address some of the 
fundamental disagreements the Court has over First Amendment 
application. As Justice Stevens points out in his Citizens United 
dissent, corporations should not necessarily be given the same 
First Amendment protections as humans since they have no 
conscience, no feelings, and no motivation other than economic 
gain.  These principles are incontrovertible, but in framing the 
restrictions through the First Amendment rights of the listener, 
the Court is able to elide them. If the focus is shifted to whether 
the corporation is speaking toward its own financial interest in 
public funds rather than determining the value of the speech to 
the political marketplace, the Court will be forced to identify the 
source of the speaker.143 
It may well be that this fact alone will keep certain judges from advancing 
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as a serious challenge to concession 
theory. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is not even clear that an 
unconstitutional conditions analysis is applicable to cases involving the 
direct restriction of political speech.  Certainly, the analysis would be 
applicable if a state government were to require incorporators to refrain 
from corporate political speech as a condition of incorporating in the state.  
However, it is less clear that using concession theory to justify the direct 
regulation of corporate political speech by the federal government similarly 
implicates the doctrine.  What benefit is the federal government 
conditioning on the waiver of First Amendment rights?  If the answer is 
“none,” then we are simply back to the question whether understanding the 
corporation as a state concession, as opposed to merely an association of 
individuals, improves the ability of the federal government to satisfy its 
strict-scrutiny burden.  In other words, if the primary purpose of the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is to limit the ability of the government 
to do indirectly (via the conditioning of benefits) what it cannot do directly, 
                                                                                                                 
 143. Michael Boardman, Constitutional Conditions: Regulating Independent Political 
Expenditures by Government Contractors After Citizens United, 10 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 
25, 45-46 (2011). 
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then the doctrine is inapplicable here because the government is in fact 
directly regulating speech.144  
IV. Conclusion 
Following Citizens United, many people asked how we got to the place 
where corporations are endowed with the same First Amendment rights as 
individuals, money is deemed speech, and courts can deny states the power 
to regulate the political influence of their own corporate creations.145  While 
I have not addressed the issue of money as speech,146 and only indirectly 
addressed the issue of corporate personhood,147 this Essay does tell an 
important story about how we got here.  Starting with Dartmouth College 
and its adoption of concession theory, a fight has been raging to free 
corporations from the shackles of state regulation.  The individuals 
advancing corporate rights gained victories at the Supreme Court level in 
                                                                                                                 
 144. Cf. Open Soc’y, 133 S. Ct. at 2327 (“Were it enacted as a direct regulation of 
speech, the Policy Requirement would plainly violate the First Amendment.  The question is 
whether the Government may nonetheless impose that requirement as a condition on the 
receipt of federal funds.”); Michael Boardman, supra note 143, at 46-47 (“[T]he 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine may not apply in the campaign finance context at 
all. . . . Deciding whether a government policy permitting individuals to display only 
American flags on highway overpasses constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination, 
the court in Brown continued, ‘[w]e decline to extend the government-funding cases to a 
situation in which the government has not appropriated any funds toward achieving a policy 
goal for which it is accountable to the electorate.’”) (quoting Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 
321 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 145. See, e.g., Robert Tracy, Corporations Are People? Money Is Speech? How Did That 
Happen!?, DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF DUPAGE COUNTY, ILL. (May 14, 2012, 9:56 AM), 
http://dupagedems.blogspot.com/2012/05/corporations-are-people-money-is-speech.html.  
As corporations are granted greater rights, one may also question where the off-setting 
responsibility and accountability comes from, in light of the fact that one of the primary 
tools of accountability is unavailable.  Cf. Erik Luna, The Curious Case of Corporate 
Criminality, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1507, 1507 (2009) (“[C]orporate criminality remains a 
curious concept. As artificial creatures of the law, corporations . . . have no emotions or 
culpable mental states. Nor are they subject to incarceration, the primary mode of 
punishment in America. To use the hoary phrase, there is ‘no soul to damn, no body to 
kick.’”). 
 146. See generally Jessica A. Levinson, The Original Sin of Campaign Finance Law:  
Why Buckley v. Valeo Is Wrong, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 881 (2013); Deborah Hellman, Money 
Talks but Isn't Speech, 95 MINN. L. REV. 953 (2011); J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the 
Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976). 
 147. Regardless of what theory of the corporation one adopts, corporations will likely 
need to be treated as persons under the law for at least some purposes in order for 
corporations to function effectively at all. 
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Santa Clara (1886) (adopting aggregate view), Hale v. Henkel (1905) 
(adopting real entity view), and Virginia Pharmacy (1976) (adopting 
listeners’ rights defense).   Finally, in Citizens United (2010), a majority of 
conservative justices, perhaps emboldened by the law and economics 
revolution in corporate law,148 relied on a revitalized 
aggregate/contractarian theory of the corporation to not only further 
advance this march in favor of corporations, but also to potentially further 
the aggregation of wealth into the hands of a few via this particular 
expansion of corporate power.149 
To many, this ever-increasing expansion of corporate power is troubling.  
Perhaps concession theory, rehabilitated as I have recommended, can help 
restore a more balanced allocation of power among corporations, the state, 
and individual citizens.  Of course, those who view corporations as standing 
firmly on the private side of the public-private divide will see all this as 
nothing more than an attempt to further statist interests at the expense of 
individual liberty.  The debate between these two sides may be 
irreconcilable—to say nothing of the view that this debate is a sham and 
that the real problem is one of “corporatocracy.”150  Interestingly, the 
intransigence of the combatants may actually serve as its own basis for 
deferring to legislatures.  As Morton Horwitz recounts:  
                                                                                                                 
 148. See generally STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL 
MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2008). 
 149. See Pat Garofalo, MIT Economist: Income Inequality In The U.S. Is Crushing the 
Middle Class’ Political Power, THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Mar 23, 2012, 5:55 PM), http://thinkpro 
gress.org/economy/2012/03/23/451166/acemoglu-income-inequality-political-power (“Today, 
ThinkProgress spoke with MIT economist Daron Acemoglu, whose new book, Why Nations 
Fail (co-written by James Robinson), looks at the effect politics and policy have on economic 
growth and prosperity. Acemoglu said that he believes the most ‘pernicious’ effect of income 
inequality is that it drains political power from lower- and middle-class Americans and allows 
the richest to then begin ‘changing the rules in their favor.’ . . . Acemoglu added that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United and the growth in Super PAC spending are only 
going to make this problem worse by increasing the importance of money in politics.”). 
 150. Priti Nemani, Globalization Versus Normative Policy: A Case Study on the Failure 
of the Barbie Doll in the Indian Market, 13 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 96, 99-100 (2011) 
(“Journalist John Perkins describes the advancement of the global empire as a result of the 
omnipotent ‘corporatocracy,’ a tripartite financial and political power relationship between 
multinational corporations (‘MNCs’), international banks, and governments. The 
corporatocracy works to guarantee the unwavering support and belief of its constituents--
schools, business, and the media--in the ‘fallacious concept’ of growing global consumer 
culture. Members of the corporatocracy promote common values and goals through an 
unceasing effort ‘to perpetuate and continually expand and strengthen the system’ of the 
current global culture.”) (quoting JOHN PERKINS, CONFESSIONS OF AN ECONOMIC HIT MAN 
26-28 (2005)). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss2/4
2014]        REHABILITATING CONCESSION THEORY 361 
 
 
Turning his back on his own quest in The Common Law, 
[Justice] Holmes regarded it as “theoretically wrong” to believe, 
for example, that the conflict between strict liability and 
negligence is capable of logical solution . . . . [J]udicial restraint 
follows from the collapse of his search for immanent rationality 
in customary law.  If law is merely politics, then the legislature 
should in fact decide.151  
Given that there appears to be a growing perception that the rulings of the 
Supreme Court are more about politics than law,152 the foregoing suggests 
more deference to the judgment of legislatures is warranted in cases like 
Citizens United.  A rehabilitated concession theory can help support this 
movement and provide a more balanced approach to corporate power. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 151. HORWITZ, supra note 37, at 130, 142. 
 152. Press Release, Alliance for Justice, Alliance for Jusice [sic] Poll Shows Americans 
Concerned About Pro-Corporate Bias and Politicization on the Supreme Court (June 14, 
2012), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-293140608.html (“Fifty-seven percent of voters 
say they are extremely concerned that the Supreme Court makes decisions based on a 
political agenda instead of the law.  Only 11% say they have a great deal of confidence that 
the Supreme Court puts politics aside and makes decisions based on the law.”). 
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